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ARTICLES
LONG-TERM CARE UNDER FIRE: A CASE
FOR RATIONAL ENFORCEMENT
Jennifer Gimler Brady*

Despite reforms to ensure that nursing homes maintain
compliance with federal quality standards, one-fourth of all
homes nationwide continue to be cited for deficiencies that
either caused actual harm to residents or carried the potential
for death or serious injury. This pattern has not changed since
the July 1995 reforms were implemented. Although the reforms
equipped federal and state regulators with many alternatives and
tools to help promote sustained compliance with Medicare and
Medicaid standards, the way in which states and HCFA have
applied them appears to have resulted in little headway against
the pattern of serious and repeated noncompliance. Such
performance may do little to dispel concerns over the health and
safety of frail and dependent nursing home residents.'
INTRODUCTION
The staggering statistics highlight the need to ensure nursing home
compliance with federal quality standards. In 1997, individuals aged sixtyfive and over comprised approximately thirteen percent of the total
population in the United States; by 2030, that number will increase to
Partner, Potter, Anderson & Corroon, LLP; LL.M. Health Law 2000, Widener
University School of Law; J.D. 1990, Dickinson School of Law; B.A. 1987, College
of William and Mary. The author would like to acknowledge Dean Barry Furrow
of the Widener University School of Law for his guidance and assistance, and her
husband Bob for his support and humor.
*

1. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT TO THE U.S. SENATE SPECIAL
COMM.

ON

AGING,

NURSING

HOMES:

ADDITIONAL

STEPS

NEEDED

TO

STRENGTHEN ENFORCEMENT OF FED. QUALITY STANDARDS 22 (1999) [hereinafter
QUALITY
STANDARDS
REPORT]
(emphasis
added),
available at

http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/he99046.pdf.
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twenty percent. 2 From 1997 to 2030, the number of individuals eighty-five
years of age and older, the group most likely to require long-term care
services,' will more than double from approximately 3.9 million people to
approximately 8.5 million people.4 By 2050, the segment of the
population eighty-five and over will double again.5 The aging baby boom
generation, consisting of approximately seventy-six million people born
between 1946 and 1964, is expected to generate an unprecedented
demand for long-term care services.' Thus, it is essential that the longterm care industry be prepared adequately to meet the increasing
demand.
Nursing home care is an important long-term care service. Every year,
more than 1.5 million people are admitted to the seventeen thousand
nursing homes throughout the United States.7 These nursing homes
provide intermediate and skilled nursing care to individuals who are too
ill to be adequately cared for in a home setting, but not so ill that they

require hospitalization.

Because nursing homes provide care to this

vulnerable group of people, overwhelmingly consisting of elderly, frail,
2. Long-Term Care: Baby Boom Generation Presents Financing Challenges,
Testimony Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 105th Cong. 4-5 (1998)
[hereinafter referred to as Panel Report] (statement of William J. Scanlon,
Director, Health Financing and Systems Issues, Health, Education, and Human
Services Div., GAO) (citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, RESIDENT POPULATION
OF THE UNITED STATES: ESTIMATES, BY AGE AND SEX (1998); U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, RESIDENT POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES: MIDDLE SERIES

PROJECTIONS, 2015 TO 2030, BY AGE AND SEX (1996); and
CENSUS,

RESIDENT

POPULATION

OF THE

UNITED

U.S. BUREAU OF THE

STATES:

MIDDLE SERIES

PROJECTIONS, 2035 TO 2050, BY AGE AND SEX (1996)), available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/ he98107t.pdf [hereinafter Scanlon Statement].

3. Id. The term "long-term care," as used herein, encompasses a variety of
health care, personal care, and supportive services that are needed by individuals
who, due to illness or chronic conditions, are unable to adequately care for

themselves. Nursing homes, the focus of this article, are just one form of longterm care; other forms include, but are not limited to, assisted living, home care
and day programs.
4. See Scanlon Statement, supra note 2, at 4.

5. Id.
6. Id.
7. U.S.

GEN. ACCOUNTING REPORT TO THE U.S. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON

AGING, CALIFORNIA NURSING HOMES: CARE PROBLEMS PERSIST DESPITE FED.

3 (1998), [hereinafter CALIFORNIA REPORT] available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/he98202.pdf 9
AND STATE OVERSIGHT
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chronically ill and often mentally limited individuals, it is not surprising
that nursing homes are one of the most scrutinized and heavily regulated
businesses in the United States. Indeed, as explained below, nursing
homes are subject to an increasingly complex web of federal and state
regulation and oversight.
It is beyond dispute that an appropriate degree of regulation and
oversight serves the laudable purpose of ensuring that nursing home
residents receive quality care in a nurturing, healthful environment.
However, at the present time, the effectiveness of governmental
regulation and oversight is being debated with an intensity that has not
been witnessed since the passage of the comprehensive nursing home
reform provisions of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987,
also known as the Nursing Home Reform Act.' At the forefront of the
debate are savvy federal and state legislators who play on the fears of the
politically powerful baby boom generation and pander for support by
advocating a "get tough on the nursing home industry" platform. One
need only consider a sampling of nursing home horror stories recounted
in the popular press to get a sense of the tenor of the debate. These
stories are replete with examples of neglect, or worse, intentional abuse,
and the nursing home industry is portrayed as thumbing its collective nose
at federal and state regulators, with bottom line-oriented nursing home
administrators making an unabashed grab for cash at the expense of
quality care.9

8. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-1396r
(1994) [hereinafter OBRA 87].
9. See, e.g., Steve Bates, Nursing Home Horrors, 42 AARP BULL. 9, Sept.

1999, at 9 ("Previous studies have found that one in four of the nation's nearly
17,000 nursing homes have serious deficiencies that harm residents or threaten
their lives."); Kym Liebler, Nursing Homes are Targeted, NEWS J. (Del.), July 24,
1998, at B1 (quoting Senator Robert Marshall, D-Wilmington West, "We
[Delaware] had over 1,000 reported accidents leading to more serious injuries. It's
a sad commentary on society, the lack of accountability. We have had a tendency
to ignore within the institutional culture of nursing home facilities the quality of
daily care given to senior citizens, or others living there."); Nursing Home Care
Declining in Maryland, NEWS J. (Del.), Jan. 10, 2000, at B6 (citing a sharp rise in
substandard care complaints since 1998); Mark Thompson, Fatal Neglect in
Possibly Thousands of Cases, Nursing Home Residents are Dying From a Lack of
Food and Water and the Most Basic Level of Hygiene, TIME, Oct. 27, 1997; Victims

of Greed, (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 25, 1991) (exposing patient abuse and
neglect in Texas nursing homes; the owners of the featured nursing homes filed a
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It should not come as a surprise that the anti-nursing home platform is
striking a chord with its intended audience. Regulators and citizens alike
are demanding increased scrutiny of nursing home operations, as well as
the imposition of significant penalties on nursing homes that are found to
provide substandard care. While both of these actions appear reasonable,
the nursing home industry is reeling from the manner in which these goals
are being pursued. Indeed, the industry is finding itself marginalized, as
regulators are shifting from an enforcement regime-marked by
cooperation and the shared goal of improving the quality of care-to a
policy focused solely on punishing any deficiency, without consideration
of any mitigating factors. The nursing home industry is again on the
defensive, fearful that the current debate over quality of care issues and
enforcement will result in yet another layer of costly and burdensome
regulation. Even more problematic, this debate is coming at a time when
reimbursement rates are being slashed and once-stable nursing home
operations are filing for bankruptcy protection in record numbers. 0 The
industry's fears are well founded.
In recent years, several new
enforcement initiatives have been implemented at both the federal and
state level, and many more are under consideration." One must question
the wisdom of imposing another layer of regulation on an industry that
already is overwhelmed by federal and state mandates. Indeed, as the
introductory quotation aptly recognizes, to the extent that there are
problems with the quality of care provided by certain nursing homes,
those problems do not exist because of a lack of regulation. Rather,
regulators' efforts would be better spent looking inward to evaluate and
improve the quality of their regulatory enforcement mechanisms.
Compounding the nursing home industry's current troubles is a
dramatic upswing in litigation aimed at the quality of care provided by
nursing homes." Previously the characteristics of the typical nursing

defamation action against ABC, but summary judgment was granted in favor of
ABC).
10. Douglas Hanks III, Nursing Homes: Condition Critical, NEWS J. (Del.),
Apr. 3, 2000, at D8. See also, Nathan Childs, How Will Long Term Care
Remember the Clinton Years, PROVIDER, Nov. 1999, at 33.
11. See HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMIN., INNOVATIVE STATE AND HCFA
NURSING

HOME

INITIATIVES,

at http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/nhi/nhidiscl.htm

(June 7, 2001). See generally Elaine C. Zacharakis, Increased FederalEnforcement
of Nursing Homes Expected, HEALTH L., July 1999, at 12.
12.

See Markian Hawryluk, Navigating Through a Legal Storm,

PROVIDER,
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home patient-advanced age, compromised physical condition, and quite
possibly, mental impairment-discouraged lawsuits for injuries allegedly
resulting from poor care. 3 Today, however, the lure of enormous punitive
damage awards has changed the playing field. For example, in November
1997, a Texas jury awarded $83 million to the family of an eighty-four
year old nursing home resident who died from dehydration and infected
pressure sores.'4 Also, in March 1998, a California jury awarded $94.7
million to a resident who suffered a broken hip and shoulder while being
transferred from her bed.'" Over the past decade, both the number and
costs of claims against nursing homes have risen significantly. 6 According
to St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, a medical professional
liability insurer that insures long-term care providers throughout the
country, the company closed approximately 2,500 claims against nursing
facilities from 1988 to 1992.' During the period from 1993 to 1997, the
number of claims soared to more than 4,200.8 Furthermore, from 1988 to
1992, only one claim exceeded $500,000, while during the period from
1993 to 1997, thirty-two claims over $500,000 were paid by the company,
including six claims that exceeded $1 million.' 9 These statistics strongly

Apr. 1999, at 26.
13. See BARRY R. FURROW
PROBLEMS 113 (3rd ed. 1997):

ET AL., HEALTH LAW CASES, MATERIALS AND

The characteristics of the nursing home population have limited their
ability to bring suit for harms suffered as a result of poor care or abuse.
Causation may be difficult to prove. Physical injuries in very frail elderly
persons may be caused either by ordinary touching or by poor care or
abuse. Mental impairment makes many nursing home residents poor
witnesses. Limited remaining life spans and disabilities minimize legally
recognizable damages. They do not suffer lost wages and costs of medical
care for injuries for the majority of patients will be covered by Medicaid
or Medicare.
Id.
14. Hawryluk, supra note 12, at 26.
15. See Gregory v. Beverly Enterprises, 80 Cal. App. 4th 514 (2000); See
Hawryluk, supra note 12, at 26. The court subsequently reduced the punitive
damage award to $3.1 million. See also CaliforniaJudge Cuts Beverly Enterprises
Verdict to $3.1 Million, WALL ST. J., June 10, 1998, at B8.

16.

Hawryluk, supra note 12, at 29.

17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.
Id.

6
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suggest that the nursing home industry may be poised to follow in the
footsteps of asbestos and tobacco as the next target of the plaintiffs' bar,
with disastrous consequences for the industry.
This article examines some of the significant challenges currently facing
the nursing home industry in the United States. It begins with a review of
the history of nursing home regulation, with a particular focus on the
comprehensive nursing home reform provisions of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1987. It then explores the new environment in
which the nation's seventeen thousand nursing homes are operating,
including recent federal initiatives aimed at the nursing home industry.
This article also discusses the Delaware General Assembly's recent
revamping of the entire nursing home oversight structure in the state, as it
serves as an informative example of the excessive regulation that
distinguishes the nursing home industry. In addition, the article examines
the disastrous impact of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 on the financial
stability of the nursing home industry. Next, it considers the upswing in
private litigation against nursing homes and its effectiveness as a deterrent
to inadequate care. Finally, the article concludes with recommendations
for addressing concerns about the nation's nursing home industry without
resorting to additional mandates that ultimately will prove to be unduly
burdensome, costly, and ineffective as a means of assuring that nursing
home residents receive high quality care.

I.

THE HISTORY OF NURSING HOME REGULATION
A.

Medicare and Medicaid

Prior to the enactment of Medicaid and Medicare in 1965, oversight of
the nursing home industry was largely the responsibility of the individual
states, with some federal guidance. 0 With Medicaid and Medicare came a
dramatic increase in federal funding of nursing homes, and the United
States Department of Health, Education and Welfare established health
and safety standards for nursing homes that wished to participate in

20. Hollis Turham, National Long Term Care Ombudsman Resource Center,
Federal Nursing Home Reform Act from the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of
1987
or
Simply
OBRA
'87
Summary,
at
http://www.Itcombudsman.org/ombpublic/ 49_346_1023.cfm (last visited Dec. 18,
2001).
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federally funded programs." However, the standards proved to be so
taxing that only 740 of the 6,000 nursing home applicants seeking
participation could be fully certified. Thus, at that time, the government
abandoned the idea of using federal nursing home licensing standards,
and it left the responsibility to the states to decide if nursing homes
qualified for participation in Medicare and Medicaid.23
In the 1970s, a highly publicized class action lawsuit, Smith v.
O'Halloran,"caused the federal government to revisit the area of nursing
home regulation. The class action plaintiffs, who were young, severelydisabled nursing home residents, sued the nursing home owners as well as
the federal government.25 In the lawsuit, the plaintiffs challenged the
quality of care provided by the Colorado nursing home and alleged that
their rights had been violated.26 In addition, the plaintiffs claimed the
government had failed to sufficiently monitor nursing homes to ensure
that residents receive adequate care.27
In 1980, while the class action litigation was proceeding, the Health
Care Financing Administration (HCFA)," an agency of the United States
Department of Health and Human Services, attempted to revise the
federal nursing home regulations regarding the process by which nursing
homes are certified for Medicare and Medicaid eligibility.29 HCFA's
intention was to shift the focus of the certification regulations from paper
reviews, designed to evaluate a facility's capability to provide care, to an
assessment of the care actually received by patients. ° However, these
regulations were rescinded by the newly-installed Reagan Administration,

21.

COMM. ON NURSING HOME REGULATION, INST. OF MED., NAT'L ACAD. OF

SCIENCES, IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF CARE IN NURSING HOMES
[hereinafter IOM REPORT].

241 (1986)

22. See id.
23. See id. at 242.
24. Smith v. O'Halloran, 557 F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1983), rev'd sub nom.
Smith v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1984).
25. Id. at 290.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. The Bush Administration on June 14, 2001 changed the Health Care
Financing Administration, HCFA, to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS).
29. IOM REPORT, supra note 21, at 247.
30. See id.
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which wanted to create its own regulatory reform effort."
In 1982, HCFA announced regulatory changes to address providers'
complaints about certain requirements being unreasonably rigid 2 The
proposed regulations would have eased the annual inspection and
certification process for facilities with a solid history of compliance.33 They
also would have allowed states to accept accreditation by the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals in lieu of state inspection as a
basis for certifying compliance with federal participation requirements.'
However, HCFA's proposed regulations were not implemented, primarily
due to the fact that they were strongly opposed by consumer groups and
most state regulatory agencies, who viewed the regulations as being too
lenient and industry-oriented.3" Thereafter, on the heels of several failed
attempts to pass new regulations, HCFA contracted with the Institute of
Medicine (1OM) of the National Academy of Sciences to engage in a
study "that would serve as a basis for adjusting federal (and state) policies
and regulations governing the certification of nursing homes so as to
make those policies and regulations as appropriate and effective as
possible."36

Coincidentally, at the time, the Smith Court determined that Medicaid
law imposes a duty upon the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
"establish a system to adequately inform herself as to whether the
facilities receiving federal money are satisfying the requirements of the
[Medicaid] Act... including providing high quality patient care."37 The
court ordered the Secretary to draft regulations to ensure that nursing
homes provide competent patient care, including the use of survey forms,
guidelines, and procedures.3"
In 1986, the IOM released its report entitled, "Improving the Quality of
Care in Nursing Homes" (IOM Report). The IOM Report identified
serious problems in both the quality of care provided to nursing home
residents, as well as the overall quality of life of residents. 9 With respect
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See id.
See id. at 1.
Id.
See id. at 1-2.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Smith v. Heckler, 747 F.2d at 583, 589 (10th Cir. 1984).
See id. at 587.
IOM REPORT, supra note 21, at 21.
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to the quality of care, the IOM Report observed that:
Providing consistently high quality care in nursing homes to a
varied group of frail, very old residents, many of whom have
mental impairments as well as physical disabilities, requires that
the functional, medical, social, and psychological needs of
residents be individually determined and met by careful
assessment and care planning - steps that require professional
skill and judgment.... To hold down costs, most of the care is
provided by nurse's aides who, in many nursing homes, are paid
very little, receive relatively little training, are inadequately
supervised, and are required to care for more residents than
they can serve properly. Not surprisingly, the turnover rate of
nurse's aides is usually very high - from 70 percent to over 100
percent per year - a factor that causes stress in resident-staff
interactions.40
The IOM Report concluded that the quality of staff-resident
relationships largely controls the quality of life that residents experience
in nursing homes, noting that "kindness, courtesy, and opportunities to
choose activities, food, and mealtimes are involved, as are factors such as
privacy for intimate conversations with family and friends."' 1 Significantly,
the IOM found that while there were a number of "good" nursing homes
that provide quality care and respect the dignity and privacy of residents,
"the Committee has the impression, obtained primarily from [HCFA's]
data collected from state reports on nursing home deficiencies, and from
discussions with knowledgeable state and federal regulatory agency
that the poor-quality homes outnumber the very good
personnel,
42
homes.
The conclusions reached by the IOM were neither novel nor
unexpected. Of greater interest were the IOM's recommendations for
improving the quality of care and the quality of life in the nation's nursing
homes. Specifically, the IOM recommended:
(1) revising the existing conditions that nursing homes must
satisfy to participate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs
(also referred to herein as "conditions of participation" or
"participation standards") and adding new conditions where

40.
41.
42.

Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 11.
Id.
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appropriate; 3
(2) strengthening the process by which nursing homes are
monitored for compliance with the conditions of participation;"
(3) implementing stronger sanctions for noncompliance with
the conditions of participation; '5 and
(4) enhancing the effectiveness of consumers and consumer
advocates in quality assurance oversight. 4"
The IOM recognized that accomplishing these goals would require
significant governmental and financial resources. However, the IOM also
noted that increased regulation alone cannot guarantee quality of life in
nursing homes. Despite the fact that one of the primary mandates to the
IOM was to formulate recommendations for an entirely new regulatory
framework for the nursing home industry, the IOM acknowledged the
practical limitations of enforcement standards, observing that:
[t]hree other factors are important [in ensuring quality care in
nursing homes]: (1) active consumer involvement and effective
consumer advocacy; (2) active community interest and
involvement in nursing homes, and (3) positive motivation on
the part of the owners and managers of nursing homes, and
well-trained, well-supervised, and properly motivated staff. The
first two are needed to help improve quality of life for residents
and influence the attitudes and performance of the government
regulators and elected officials as well as the attitudes and
behavior of the management and staff of nursing homes. The
third is essential for high-quality care. Pressures by regulators
and consumers certainly can influence management and staff
attitudes and behavior, but such pressures are not sufficient to
attract the quality of personnel needed to provide high quality of
care and quality of life to nursing home residents. The desire for
excellent performance and the ability to create the climate that
will attract highly motivated and well-qualified professionals to
work in nursing homes must be nurtured by sources within the
industry and the educational and professional institutions that
train and foster professional values, attitudes, and ethical
47
standards.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See id. at 25-32.
See id. at 32-38.
See id. at 38-40.
See id. at 41-42.
Id. at 171-72 (emphasis added).
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Still, the significance of the IOM's work lies in its recommendations,
which served as the foundation for a complete overhaul of the processes
by which nursing homes are surveyed for compliance with participation
standards and sanctioned when they fall short of those standards.
B.

The Omnibus Budget ReconciliationAct of 1987

Based in large part upon the conclusions and recommendations set
forth in the IOM Report, in 1987 Congress passed sweeping legislation
aimed at monitoring and regulating the nursing home industry in the
United States. The legislation, the Omnibus Budget Reconcilation Act of
1987 (OBRA 87), ' 8 changed the way that states and the federal
government oversee nursing homes and protect the well-being of nursing
home residents. The OBRA 87 revisions included the development of
federal standards in three major areas: (1) requirements for providers
who participate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs;' 9 (2) patient
outcome-focused survey and certification processes for evaluating
compliance with participation requirements;" and (3) sanctions and
enforcement procedures to respond to noncompliance' Implementation
of these regulations followed in two stages. Regulations relating to
conditions of participation were effective by October 1990.52 However,
enforcement regulations were delayed until July 1995, purportedly due to
their controversial nature and the large volume of comments received
during the rulemaking process. 3
1.

Participationrequirements

Pursuant to OBRA 87, nursing homes that provide skilled nursing care
or rehabilitation services, "must provide services and activities to attain or
maintain the highest practicable physical, mental, and psychosocial wellbeing of each resident in accordance with a written plan of care."4 HCFA

48.
49.
50.
51.

OBRA 87, supra note 8.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(b) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
See id. § 1395i-3(g).
See id. § 1395i-3(h).

52.

QUALITY STANDARDS REPORT, supra note 1, at 7.

53. See id.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(b)(2) (Supp. 1999). Facilities that provide skilled
nursing care are referred to as "skilled nursing facilities" in the federal
participation regulations.
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implements this mandate through regulations regarding participation
requirements for nursing homes." To achieve the goal of providing
quality care that maximizes each resident's potential (and therefore,
become certified under Medicare and Medicaid), nursing homes must
satisfy over 130 separate requirements 6 including:
" conducting annual assessments of each individual resident;57
" creating individualized care plans;58
* reducing the use of chemical and physical restraints;59
" ensuring that nursing assistants receive additional training in the
care of persons with cognitive impairments;'
" providing basic services, including: nursing services, dietary
services, physician services, specialized rehabilitation services,
dental services, and pharmacy services;6 and
* enforcing and protecting residents' rights, which include the right
to choose a personal attending physician, the right to privacy and
confidentiality, the right to participate in residents' groups and
visits with family members, and other rights that emphasize the
individual dignity of nursing home residents and their entitlement
62
to be free from abuse and neglect.
The extent of a nursing home's compliance with the foregoing
requirements of participation is verified through a survey process. HCFA
delegates the survey process to the agency in each state that has
responsibility for inspecting and licensing nursing homes within that
state.& The state survey agency must certify that nursing homes
participating in federal funding programs meet all requirements of
participation. ' It should be emphasized that federal preemption in the
area of nursing home regulation is not complete. States may set their own
55.

See id.

56.

See 42 C.F.R. §§ 483.10-.75 (2001).

57.

42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(b)(3) (1994 & Supp. 1999).

58.
59.
60.

Id. § 1395i-3(b)(2).
Id. § 1395i-3(c)(1)(A)(ii).
Id. § 1395i-3(b)(5)(E).

61.
62.

See id. § 1395i-3(b)(4) (Supp. 1999); 42 C.F.R. §§ 483.10-.75 (2001).
42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(c) (1994 & Supp. 1999).

63.
64.

See id. § 1395i-3(g)(1)(A).

See id. HCFA (now CMS) retains responsibility for certifying the
compliance of state-owned skilled nursing facilities with federal participation

requirements.
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standards that nursing homes must meet in order to operate, provided
that such standards do not conflict with federal mandates. 6 In effect, the
federal nursing home standards serve as baseline requirements, and states
are free to impose standards that are more stringent than those imposed
under federal law.'
2.

Survey procedures

In order to operate, nursing homes must be licensed by the state in
which they are located. 67 As noted above, nursing homes also must be
certified by the federal government to participate in federal funding
programs, including Medicare and Medicaid. Each state has a survey
agency responsible for inspecting and licensing nursing homes. The state
survey agency serves a dual role in that it also conducts surveys on behalf
of HCFA to determine whether nursing homes meet (and continue to
meet) participation requirements for certification under Medicare and
Medicaid. 68 HCFA is responsible for ensuring that nursing homes comply
with federal mandates, 69 and it contracts with one agency in each state for
the purpose of conducting surveys to evaluate the extent of compliance
with federal participation standards.70
The state agency conducts two types of surveys. The first, known as a
"standard survey," must be conducted without notice at least once every
fifteen months.7' If an individual provides a nursing home with advance
notice of a standard survey, that person is subject to a civil monetary
penalty not to exceed $2,000.72 During the standard survey, the survey
team evaluates a nursing home's compliance with both federal
participation requirements and the state's licensure laws. 73 The standard
survey generally entails "a team of state surveyors spending several days
on site conducting a broad review of care and services with regard to

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
488.308
72.
73.

See id.
See id.
42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(d)(2)(A) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
See id. § 1395i-3(g)(1)(A).
See CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 6.
See id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(2)(A)(iii)(I) (1994 & Supp. 1999); 42 C.F.R. §
(2001).
42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(2)(A)(i) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
See CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 6.
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meeting the assessed needs of the residents." 7' The surveyors evaluate
medical, nursing and rehabilitative care, dietary and nutrition services,
activities and social participation, and physical plant characteristics.75 The
survey team also reviews a sampling of residents' care plans and
assessments to determine accuracy and adequacy.76

In addition, the

surveyors evaluate the facility's compliance with and promotion of
residents' rights. 7" If the surveyors find that a nursing home has failed to
meet any applicable federal or state requirement or regulation, they can
cite the nursing home for a deficiency that may lead to enforcement
action against the facility. 7 The surveyors have at their disposal an arsenal
of federal and state sanctions that can be used to punish noncompliant
nursing homes.
The other form of "survey" is a complaint investigation. A complaint
investigation typically involves a targeted review focused on a specific
complaint that has been lodged against the nursing home." When a
complaint is received, the state agency must complete an investigation of
the complaint within a certain period of time depending on the
seriousness of the allegation."
In general, states apply HCFA's
classification and sanctioning scheme for deficiencies cited during
standard surveys. For complaint investigations, however, the state agency
generally applies the state's classification and penalty scheme. In most
cases, HCFA accepts the reporting and recommendations of the state
survey agency, but it is free to modify the state agency's assessment if it
chooses to do so."

The federal survey and certification system created under OBRA 87
changed the focus of the nursing home survey from paper compliance to
patient outcomes. Previously, the survey process was akin to a paper
review, as surveyors reviewed the records of nursing facilities to

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
80.
81.
82.
83.
(2001).

Id.
42 C.F.R. § 488.305 (a)(2) (2001).
Id. § 488.304 (a)(3).
Id. § 488.305 (a)(4).
See id. § 488.330.
See CALIFORNIA REPORT, supranote 7, at 5.
See id.
See id. at 6. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(4) (Supp. 1999).
See QUALITY STANDARDS REPORT, supra note 1, at 5; 42 C.F.R. § 488.452
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determine compliance with participation requirements. 8 The OBRA 87
survey is a more hands-on process that examines facility operations and
staff interactions with residents to determine whether the facility is
providing quality care to residents. Under OBRA 87, deficient providers
face a range of sanctions that may be imposed based on the level of
seriousness of the identified deficiency.
3.

Sanctions

OBRA 87 is in accord with the IOM's recommendation for stronger
regulatory enforcement. In an effort to ensure that nursing homes
achieve and maintain an acceptable level of compliance with the
conditions of participation, OBRA 87 greatly expanded the range of
enforcement sanctions that may be imposed on poorly performing nursing
homes. The IOM Report noted that many nursing homes tend to cycle in
and out of compliance. Prior to OBRA 87, the only sanctions available
for noncompliance were termination from the Medicare or Medicaid
program' or, under certain circumstances, denial of payments for new
Medicare or Medicaid residents. 7 In addition to denial of payments and
termination of program participation, OBRA 87 expanded the sanctions
arsenal to include the following:
(1) civil monetary penalties, ranging from $50 to $10,000 per
day;'
(2) appointment of a substitute manager by the state survey
agency, with authority to hire, fire, and reassign staff, obligate
funds, and alter facility procedures as appropriate;6
(3) directed in-service training, whereby a facility is required to
train staff on a specific issue identified as a problem during a
84.

See generally Terri D. Keville et al., Seventeenth Annual Health Law

Symposium: Recent Developments in Long-term Care Law and Litigation, 20
WHITTIER

L. REV. 325 (1998) (discussing the survey process pre- and post-OBRA

87).
85.
86.

IOM REPORT, supra note 21, at 148-49.

Approximately eighty-six percent of all nursing homes are Medicare-

certified or Medicare- and Medicaid-certified. Fourteen percent of all nursing
homes have Medicaid certifications only. QUALITY STANDARDS REPORT, supra
note 1, at 5.
87.
88.
89.

See id. at 5.
42 C.F.R. § 488.406 (a)(3) (2001).
Id. § 488.406 (a)(1).
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survey;90
(4) directed plan of correction, whereby a facility is required to
take action within a specified time frame according to a plan of
correction developed by HCFA, the state enforcement agency,
or the temporary manager; 9'
(5) placement of a state monitor in the nursing facility to help
ensure that the facility achieves and maintains compliance;' and
(6) transfer of residents and closure of the facility. 93
Congress intended the new OBRA 87 sanctions, particularly civil
monetary penalties, to provide a strong incentive for nursing homes to
achieve and maintain compliance with the conditions of participation in
Medicare and Medicaid. The sanctions were implemented through
regulations that reflected HCFA's approach to the conditions of
participation-that all standards must be met and enforced, but the
significance of a particular violation depends on the circumstances and the
actual or potential effect on residents.
The regulations create a framework for evaluating the relative
seriousness of each instance of noncompliance with participation
requirements, and tie the appropriate sanctions to the seriousness of the
identified deficiencies. 9' The level of seriousness is determined by
consideration of whether a facility's deficiencies constitute: (a) no actual
harm with a potential for minimal harm; 9 (b) no actual harm with a
potential for more than minimal harm, but not immediate jeopardy;' (c)
actual harm that is not immediate jeopardy;' or (d) immediate jeopardy
to resident health or safety.9" The agency also must determine if the
deficiencies: (a) are isolated; 9 (b) constitute a pattern;"° or (c) are
90.
91.
92.

Id. § 488.406 (a)(8).
Id. § 488.406 (a)(7).
Id. § 488.406 (a)(4).

93.
94.

Id. § 488.406 (a)(6).
See § 488.408. In this section, the remedies identified in § 488.406 are

classified into three categories. The level of seriousness of the deficiency
determines the category of remedy that is applicable to the deficiency.
95. Id. § 488.404 (b)(1)(i).
96. Id. § 488.404 (b)(1)(ii).
97. Id. § 488.404 (b)(1)(iii).
98. Id. § 488.404 (b)(iv).
99. Id. § 488.404 (b)(2)(i).
100. Id. § 488.404 (b)(2)(ii).
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widespread. 1 Obviously, deficiencies that involve immediate jeopardy to
the health or safety of residents are the most serious and are responded to
with the most aggressive remedies.
Nursing homes that are in "substantial compliance," which means that
they have no serious deficiencies, are not subject to sanctions. 2 Serious
deficiencies, on the other hand, may be remedied with the imposition of
multiple sanctions. Moreover, a history of noncompliance places a facility
at risk for the imposition of the most stringent remedies. For example, if
a facility is cited for deficiencies during its last three consecutive standard
surveys, denial of payments for all new admissions and state monitoring
will be imposed automatically. 3
II.

THE NEW ENVIRONMENT
A.

Life After OBRA 87

OBRA 87 completely changed the method for monitoring nursing
homes for compliance with the conditions of participation in the Medicare
and Medicaid programs. Nursing homes and regulators alike have spent
the past ten years becoming familiar with and applying the OBRA 87
survey requirements and enforcement remedies. Recently, the survey and
enforcement mechanisms created under OBRA 87 have been criticized as
being ineffective and too lenient on the nursing home industry. Such
criticisms seem unfair, as the changes ushered in by OBRA 87 have barely
had sufficient time to take hold. Indeed, the enforcement regulations
have only been in place since 1995. Regardless, legislators and citizen
groups calling for crackdowns on the nursing home industry have found a
receptive audience. In fact, a witch-hunt mentality has taken hold, and
both federal and state regulators are being pressured into adopting a takeno-prisoners approach to nursing home enforcement. °4 Rather than
working with the nursing home industry to perfect systems and
procedures designed to ensure that nursing home residents receive the
best care possible, regulators have shifted the emphasis (and resources) to
ferreting out, punishing, and even criminalizing instances of
noncompliance with participation standards. The fundamental question
101.

Id. § 488.404 (b)(2)(iii).

102.

See QUALITY STANDARDS REPORT, supra note

103.
104.

42 C.F.R. § 488.414 (2001).
See Childs, supra note 10, at 36-37.

1, at 8-9.
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that must be addressed is whether this new punitive approach will only
serve to exacerbate the problems that it seeks to remedy. Nursing homes
may be forced to make the Hobson's choice of either shifting already
strained resident care resources to regulatory compliance efforts or
running the risk of incurring harsh penalties that could drive many
facilities out of business.
B.

Senator Grassley'sIndictment of CaliforniaNursing Homes

In July 1998, the General Accounting Office (GAO) released a
damning study of the California nursing home industry." At the request
of the United States Senate Special Committee on Aging, chaired by
Senator Charles Grassley (R) of Iowa, the GAO reviewed data from
nursing home surveys conducted by the California Department of Health
Services (DHS), the state survey agency, between 1995 and 1998.'06 The
GAO found that 407 nursing homes, or nearly one-third of the state's
nursing homes, were cited for deficiencies involving death or serious harm
to residents.' 7 Moreover, the GAO sampled the sixty-two cases of
California nursing home residents who died in 1993 and found that thirtyfour of the residents received unacceptable care, including unexplained
and unmonitored weight loss, as well as improperly treated pressure
108
sores.
Although DHS issued a significant number of citations during the
period covered by the study, the GAO believed that the state surveyors
were able to uncover only a portion of care-related problems existing in
California's nursing homes.' °9 According to the GAO, despite the
presence of a complex federal and state oversight infrastructure, a
significant number of California nursing homes were not sufficiently
monitored to ensure the safety and well-being of nursing home residents.
The GAO blamed the predictability of annual surveys, inaccurate or
105. See California Nursing Homes: Federal and State Oversight Inadequate to
Protect Residents in Homes with Serious Care Violations, Testimony Before the
Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 105th Cong. 6 (1998), [hereinafter Scanlon
California Statement] available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/ 1998/he98219t.pdf
(statement of William J. Scanlon, Director, Health Financing and Systems Issues,
Health, Education, and Human Services Div., GAO).
106. Id.
107. Scanlon CaliforniaStatement, supra note 105, at 6.
108. Id. at5.
109. See id. at 7.
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otherwise misleading entries in medical records, and limitations in survey
methods prescribed by HCFA for the alleged understatement of
deficiencies." ° In particular, the GAO took issue with HCFA's procedure
for selecting a sample of residents for review. HCFA's procedure does
not call for randomly selecting a sufficient sample of residents; instead,
HCFA relies upon the professional expertise and judgment of the
surveyors to identify the resident cases to be reviewed."' In the GAO's
view, the lack of random sampling by HCFA permits cases of substandard
care to escape scrutiny.
The GAO report was most critical of the enforcement mechanisms in
California. The GAO noted that between July 1995 and March 1998,
DHS surveyors cited 122 homes in both of their last two surveys for
conditions involving actual harm or immediate jeopardy to residents, yet
HCFA enforcement policies led to very few federal disciplinary actions
against these homes." 2 In fact, despite the variety of new enforcement
sanctions available under OBRA 87, only 33 of the 122 homes were
penalized with federal sanctions." 3 The GAO cited "HCFA's forgiving
stance toward homes with a 'ping-pong' history of compliance" as the
reason that nursing homes with citations involving immediate jeopardy or
actual harm escape federal sanctions." 4
According to the GAO, only two percent of survey deficiencies cited
during the study period were referred to HCFA for the immediate
imposition of remedies" The other ninety-eight percent of noncompliant
nursing homes were granted a grace period to correct the cited
deficiencies, regardless of the facilities' past performance. 6 To be fair,
however, the GAO noted that nationwide, the percentage of
noncompliant nursing homes that receive a grace period to correct
deficiencies is higher-ninety-nine percent. 7
The GAO found it troubling that, pursuant to HCFA policy, DHS and
other state survey agencies do not appear to take into account a nursing

110.
111.

See id.
Id. at 9.

112.

Id. at 10.

113.

Id.

114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.

20

Journalof Contemporary Health Law and Policy

[Vol. 18:1

home's compliance history in determining whether a grace period should
be granted."'
As a result, the GAO concluded that noncompliant
facilities have managed to avoid sanctions year after year, and thus, they
have little incentive to ensure that cited deficiencies are effectively
corrected. "9
Curiously, DHS did not appear to be the target of the GAO report.
Rather, the message of the report seemed to be "you're only as good as
the tools you have to work with, and HCFA hasn't provided you with the
right tools."'20 Caught in the middle, however, DHS reacted to the GAO
report with an impassioned defense of its own efforts to regulate the
state's nursing home industry, while openly chastising HCFA and
Congress for failing to provide the leadership and resources necessary to
ensure that nursing homes are fully committed to providing quality care
to residents. 2'
In her written testimony to the Special Committee on Aging, S.
Kimberly Belsh6, Director of DHS, defended DHS's oversight of the
nursing home industry in California.' She assured the public and family
members of DHS's dedication to ensuring that nursing home residents
live in a nurturing, safe environment.'23 Further, she noted that contrary
to the impression created by the GAO report, California has been at the
forefront of the implementation of the OBRA 87 survey and enforcement
process."' Ms. Belsh6 based her views on the quality of surveys, training
of staff, number of deficiencies cited and remedies imposed, including $2.1
million in federal civil monetary penalties assessed between February
1996 and April 1998."
Ms. Belsh6 also took issue with the methodology of the GAO study.
Specifically, she criticized its focus on deaths that occurred in nursing
homes two full years prior to the implementation of OBRA 87
118. See id. at 12.
119. See id.
120. Id.
121. See S. Kimberly Belsh6, Director, California Dep't of Health Services,
Written Testimony Preparedfor the U.S. Senate Special Comm. on Aging, at 2 (July
28, 1998), http://www.dhs.ca.gov/lnc/nhomegao/testimony.htm (on file with
author).
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 2.
125. See id.
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enforcement regulations in 1995.6 Particularly compelling was Ms.
Belsh6's observation that if the intention of the report was to evaluate the
effectiveness of the OBRA 87 survey and enforcement process, the study
should have focused on events that occurred following full
implementation of the OBRA 87 regulations. 7
Ms. Belsh6 closed her written testimony with detailed
recommendations to Congress and HCFA for improving the federal
survey and enforcement process. She specifically entreated Congress to
increase funding to HCFA so that the predictability of surveys could be
decreased and the number of surveys could be increased."" She also
called for the enactment of federal penalties for medical records
falsification, referring to the GAO's observation that the questionable
thoroughness and accuracy of medical records likely shielded many
problems from surveyor scrutiny. 9 Ms. Belsh6 further recommended that
HCFA: (1) make the survey process more stringent by requiring a
"revisit" survey to verify correction of all cited deficiencies; (2) increase
the states' survey budgets to reflect the cost of performing a "quality"
survey, as opposed to an "average" survey; (3) study the differences in
survey and enforcement implementation between regions of the country
and formulate "best practices" recommendations that can be shared and
utilized by all state survey agencies; (4) fund abbreviated surveys for all
complaints; and (5) revise the federal certification and survey database so
130
that it provides vital enforcement data in a usable format.
The GAO's study of the California nursing home industry called
attention to serious problems with the quality of care being provided in
many nursing homes. 3' Obviously, such problems are not limited to
California. However, the California study revealed significant problems
with the manner in which HCFA and the state survey agencies have
implemented the OBRA 87 survey and enforcement process."'
126.

See id. at 3.

127.

See id. ("This disconnection between the GAO's focus-the effectiveness

of nursing home oversight in the context of OBRA 1987-and the data used in
part, calls into question the appropriateness of applying the report's findings to
the current OBRA process, especially in 1998.").
128. See id. at 4.
129. See id.

130.

Id. at 4-5.

131.

See id. at 3.

132.

Id.
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Following the issuance of the GAO report, the federal government
launched an initiative aimed at improving the quality of care provided to
the nation's nursing home residents.'33 Individual state legislatures have
also introduced a variety of new proposals to regulate the nursing home
industry.'' The primary purpose behind many of these initiatives has
been to create new layers of regulation and to increase both the severity
and imposition of penalties imposed on noncompliant nursing homes. "'
Unfortunately, the GAO's criticisms directed to correct the inadequacies
of the enforcement community itself have largely been lost in the shuffle.
It is incongruous that the regulatory community would pursue new
mandates when evidence shows that historically, regulators have been
ineffective and inconsistent in the implementation and application of
existing regulatory requirements.
C.

PresidentClinton's 1998 Nursing Home Quality Initiative

HCFA launched the Nursing Home Quality Initiative in July 1998 as an
ameliorative response to the GAO report on the California nursing home
industry. President Clinton unveiled the initiative during a televised news
conference, during which he committed to strengthening state
enforcement and federal oversight of the nursing home industry."' The
President announced several new administrative actions to be
implemented by HCFA, including:
* imposing penalties immediately upon finding that a nursing home
has committed a serious or chronic violation, thereby doing away
with grace periods for facilities with repeated violations;'37
* strengthening the states' inspection of nursing homes by staggering
survey times, performing surveys during evenings and weekends,
and targeting poorly performing facilities with more frequent
inspections;3 ' and

133.
134.
135.

See QUALITY
See id. at 26.
See id. at 3-4.

STANDARDS REPORT,

supra note 1, at 2.

136. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Clinton
Administration Announces New Initiative to Improve the Quality of Care In
Nursing
Homes
(July
21,
1998),
available
at
http://www.hhs.gov./news/press/1998pres/980721a.html.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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referring egregious violations of quality of care standards to the
Office of Inspector General and the Department of Justice for
investigation, and, if appropriate, prosecution.'39
President Clinton also stated that HCFA would increase its oversight of
the state survey agencies and take decisive action against states that are
failing to enforce standards. 40 These actions include terminating federal
nursing home inspection funding to states where oversight of the nursing
home industry clearly is inadequate. 4
HCFA took the President's
directives seriously and expanded states' abilities to impose fines as high
as $10,000 per survey infraction, eliminated grace periods for facilities
with repeated violations,'42 and directed states to begin criminal
investigations
of complaints involving resident harm within ten days of
4
receipt.

1

Nursing home industry representatives have encountered a complete
change in the manner in which the regulatory community views the
industry. Linda Keegan, vice president of the American Health Care
Association, a national nursing home industry organization, characterized
the new environment very plainly: "It's become truly an us versus them
environment. The administration's emphasis is on punishment, not fixing
the system's problems."'" This sentiment has been echoed by other
industry representatives, including Stephen Guillard, CEO of Boston's
Harborside Healthcare, who likewise observed:
We have seen instance after instance where a company and its
officials, with a superb track record, are not given any leeway to
enter into an agreement to correct problems that occur. Zero
tolerance for deficiencies that are not life-threatening has
become the norm, and as a result more beds are now facing
decertification than at any other point in the history of the
5
industry."'

139.

Id.

140. Childs, supra note 39.
141. See id. Ominously, President Clinton stated: "If state enforcement
agencies don't do enough to monitor nursing home quality, we will cut off their
contracts and find someone else who will do it right." Nathan Childs, How Will
Long Term Care Remember the Clinton Years? PROVIDER, Nov. 1999, at 39.
142. See QUALITY STANDARDS REPORT, supra note 1, at 8-9.
143. See CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 5..
144. Childs, supra note 113, at 39.
145. Id.
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The "zero tolerance" approach has been reflected in more recent
federal nursing home initiatives. For example, in December 1998, HCFA
and the United States Department of Justice announced that they would
work together to develop guidelines for prosecuting nursing home cases
involving "egregious" violations.' During a subsequent working group
conference, Deputy Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. informed law
enforcement representatives and nursing home regulators that "[i]f
[nursing] facilities know that you are meeting regularly with regulators
and law enforcement to discuss inadequate care in nursing homes, that
coordination alone can be a very powerful incentive for problem facilities
to improve the care they provide."1 '7
In addition, on December 14, 1999, HCFA announced that nursing
homes found to have isolated incidents of physical harm to residents
would be subject to immediate fines of up to $10,000 per instance of
abuse." This new policy expanded previous enforcement rules that called
for immediate fines after patient harm was determined to be widespread
or habitual within a facility. Based upon state survey data from 1998,
HCFA projected that approximately twelve percent of the nation's
seventeen thousand nursing homes would face immediate sanctions under
the new policy, which imposes fines on nursing homes found to have
harmed a resident during two consecutive state surveys.
Moreover, the Clinton administration asked Congress to add $15.9
million in fiscal year 2001 to improve oversight of the nation's nursing
homes. "° This increased funding will be used to provide more training to
nursing home surveyors, increase the number and frequency of
unannounced surveys, and more closely
supervise the nation's hundred
51
worst-performing nursing facilities.'
However, the request for increased funding was not uniformly well146. See HCFA, DOJ Develop Planfor ProsecutingNursing Home Violations,
Report Says, DAILY REP. FOR EXEC. (BNA) No. 248, Dec. 29, 1998, at A18.
147. Enforcement Officials Urge InterdisciplinaryApproach to Prevent Nursing
Home Abuses, DAILY REP. FOR EXEC. (BNA) No. 207, Oct. 27, 1999, at A25.
148. See HCFA Announces New Sanctions to Curb Isolated Incidents of
Nursing Home Abuse, DAILY REP. FOR EXEC. (BNA) No. 240, Dec. 15, 1999, at
A31.
149. Id.
150. •See Clinton Hopes to Improve Nursing Homes By Adding $15 Million to
Inspect Conditions, DAILY REP. FOR EXEC. (BNA) No. 11, Jan. 18, 2000, at A21.
151.

See id.
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received. Senator Grassley, a vocal HCFA critic, warned that throwing
money at nursing home oversight is not the solution to the industry's ills.152
Senator Grassley remarked that HCFA does a "poor job" of overseeing
its regional offices, which, in turn oversee the state survey agencies, and
added that until HCFA improves its oversight, "[w]e could quadruple
enforcement money with no guarantees of success. It's like throwing cash
into a river." '53 The nursing home industry was equally pointed in its
criticism of the requested funding increase, arguing that the money would
be better spent on increasing federal payments to nursing homes, thus
enabling them to hire additional patient caregivers. The nursing home
industry' regards this step as "the key to quality health care in any
setting. ""
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the federal government has
actively pursued the nursing home industry through a variety of
initiatives, all of which ostensibly are aimed at improving the quality of
care delivered in the nation's nursing homes. The effectiveness of the
initiatives continues to be a subject of debate. On one side are the hardline regulators who want greater ability to punish nursing homes that fail
to comply with participation requirements. On the other side are the
nursing home administrators who seek a cooperative and problem-solving
approach to nursing home regulation. Presently, it appears that the hardliners are gaining the upper hand, and now, states are joining the debate.
For example, since 1997 the State of Delaware has completely revamped
how it monitors nursing homes for compliance with federal and state
regulatory requirements, and how it penalizes homes when they fall short
of those requirements. Regrettably, as has been the case with the federal
reform initiatives, the emphasis has been on formulating new regulations
rather than requiring the regulators to improve their survey and
enforcement processes. Pursuing new regulations is an irrational response,

152. See id. at A22.
153. Id.
154. Id. (quoting Linda Keegan, Vice President, American Health Care
Association). Interestingly, on November 3, 1999, the U.S. Senate Special
Committee on Aging held a forum on nursing home staffing problems. Panelists
cited several causes for staffing shortages, including inadequate federal funding
for long term care, the lack of national minimum staffing requirements and the
See Nursing Home
stress and low pay of nursing home employment.
Understaffing Blamed on Low Pay, High Stress, Poor Funding, DAILY REP. FOR
EXEC.

(BNA) No. 213, Nov. 4, 1999, at A32.
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since the problem is how compliance with the already voluminous
regulations is evaluated and enforced.
D.

Delaware Nursing Home Reform

1. State legislative and citizens investigative panel
On September 29, 1997, Delaware State Senator Robert Marshall held
a press conference to announce the formation of the State Legislative and
Citizens Investigative Panel on Nursing Home Reform ("Panel").1"' The
Panel was created for the purpose of conducting the first comprehensive
investigation of Delaware nursing home practices since the 1960s.
Senator Marshall chaired the fourteen-member Panel, which was
comprised of state legislators, representatives of the American
Association of Retired Persons, attorneys with expertise in elder law
issues, and members of the general public with various associations with
6
the long-term care industry.1
On October 27, 1997, and October 30, 1997, public hearings regarding
nursing home reform were held in New Castle County, Delaware.'57
Earlier that month, similar hearings took place in Delaware's two other
counties, Kent and Sussex. The October hearings were held for the
purpose of eliciting testimony from members of the general public
regarding their experiences with nursing homes located in Delaware.
Senator Marshall opened the first New Castle County hearing by stating
that the Delaware nursing home industry was in need of major change
and improvement. He noted that the Panel intended to formulate
legislation to address perceived deficiencies in the industry. 118 After
155. For reference to the Panel's formation, see STATE LEGISLATIVE AND
CITIZENS INVESTIGATIVE PANEL ON NURSING HOME REFORM, REPORT TO THE
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 3 (1998) [hereinafter Panel Report] (on file
with author).

156.

Seeid. at 1.

157. The author followed the activities of the Panel and attended several of the
public hearings on nursing home reform discussed herein. The testimony
presented to the Panel and the events of the public hearings are recounted from
the notes of the author, unless otherwise indicated.
158. The mission statement of the Panel was described as follows:
The purpose of the Legislative and Citizens Investigative Panel on
Nursing Home Reform is to ensure that residents of Delaware nursing
homes are safe and secure, are receiving quality care, and are free from
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Senator Marshall concluded his initial remarks, several members of the
audience were called to relate stories of abuse and neglect of nursing
home patients. 9 The incidents ranged from insensitive and disparaging
remarks directed to residents and family members by facility staff to
extreme physical and mental abuse of residents by staff.'60
Neglect and inadequate supervision were also common complaints.
One woman stated that her wheelchair-bound mother, who suffered from
dementia, passed undetected through an emergency exit door and fell
down a flight of stairs, with the wheelchair landing on top of her. Over six
hours passed before facility staff discovered that the woman was missing,
and several more hours passed before she was located in the stairwell.
Despite the ordeal, the resident survived.
Occasionally, there was a bright spot in the public testimony, as a few
family members informed the Panel that their loved ones had received
compassionate and expert care while residing in particular nursing
facilities. However, the Panel made it clear that it did not welcome such
comments, and a Panel member even accused one family member of
being "put up" to his testimony by nursing home administrators. 6' Given
the Panel's mission to recommend reforms for the nursing home industry,
it is not surprising that the Panel denounced any testimony that suggested
many nursing homes were already providing high quality care. Rather,
the Panel actively solicited horror stories, and many Delaware facilities
were implicated in the fray.
One point that Panel members, nursing home administrators, and
family members uniformly agreed upon was the difficulty of attracting
and retaining competent and compassionate caregivers, particularly
Certified Nursing Assistants (CNAs). According to figures provided by
the U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging, CNAs provide at least
abuse, neglect and financial exploitation.
Panel Report, supra note 155, at 2.
159. See id. at 4.
160. Author's notes; Panel Report, supra note 155, at 4.
161. Senator Marshall took up the cause of nursing home reform after his
father passed away in a Delaware nursing facility. Senator Marshall's motivation
is reflected in the preamble to minimum staffing legislation introduced by the
Senator, which reads: "This Act shall be referred to and cited as 'Eagle's Law' in
memory of Ignatius Adam 'Eagle' Marshall, patriot, husband and father, whose
experiences in a Delaware nursing facility inspired this legislation." S. 115, 140th
Gen. Assem. (Del. 1999).
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eighty percent of the patient care in nursing facilities nationwide, and the
average wage for CNAs is $6.94 per hour. 162 The turnover rate among
CNAs is between eighty to ninety percent annually. 16 Several witnesses
and Panel members noted that although CNAs are primarily responsible
for ensuring that residents' physical needs are attended to, they frequently
are ill-equipped to provide the necessary care in a manner that recognizes
and promotes the dignity of the residents. Specific problems identified by
the witnesses and Panel members included: a lack of training; a lack of
accountable supervision; a lack of suitable temperament for the job, which
can be both physically and mentally demanding; overwhelming caseloads
that prevent CNAs from giving adequate attention to any one resident;
and inadequate compensation ($6.00 to $10.00 per hour was common in
Delaware at that time), which may discourage better qualified and more
reliable candidates from applying for CNA positions."
It was clear that the vast majority of the speakers at the public hearings
intended to underscore the need for reform, rather than to extol the
virtues of the nursing home industry. Unquestionably, their messages
touched a nerve in Delaware. The hearings and testimony received
widespread media coverage, sparking numerous letters to local
newspapers both for and against the nursing home industry. For the most
part, however, the news accounts and letters focused on the horror stories,
rather than the positive experiences.
In November and December 1997, other prominent players in the
Delaware nursing home industry had the opportunity to publicly address
the comments made during the October public hearings. First, the state
agencies with oversight responsibilities presented testimony to the Panel.
The Division of Public Health, the Office of Health Facilities Licensing
and Certification ("Health Facilities"), which at that time was responsible
for licensing and surveying long-term care facilities in the state, the Office
of the Long-term Care Ombudsman, which serves as an advocate for
162. See Nursing Home Understaffing Blamed on Low Pay, High Stress, Poor
Funding,DAILY REP. FOR EXEC. (BNA) No. 213, Nov. 4, 1999, at A33.

163. See id.
164. Delaware nursing homes are facing a particularly difficult staffing
shortage, as the unemployment rate statewide is low (totalling 3.2 percent in
September 2001, with a rate of 3.1 percent in New Castle County, the state's
population center). See Delaware Department of Labor's Office of Occupational
and Labor Market Information, available at http://www.oolmi.net/data/lausfin.htm
(last visited Dec. 18, 2001).
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residents, the state Medicaid Office, the Division of Aging, and the
Delaware Attorney General's Office all were represented at the agency
hearing.165 In general, the state agencies agreed with the Panel that
Delaware nursing homes urgently need more effective oversight.
However, rather than pointing to a lack of regulation as the culprit, the
agencies advocated for more funding and increased staffing, saying that
the lack of resources impedes the enforcement community's abilities to
deter, detect and punish providers of substandard care.
Representatives of nursing facilities had an opportunity to respond to
the many concerns voiced during the various hearings on December 10,
1997. The industry hearing attracted a large audience, in part because the
public was interested in the industry's response to the numerous criticisms
that were lodged against nursing homes during the preceding two months
of public hearings. While industry representatives recognized that there
was room for improvement, they uniformly agreed that additional
regulation would not remedy the identified problems. Indeed, one
speaker noted that the nursing home industry already is one of the most
heavily regulated industries in the United States, second only to nuclear
power. Instead, the industry proposed that the Panel consider ways to
improve the training, supervision, accountability, compensation and job
satisfaction of primary caregivers. The Panel received the industry's
recommendations with polite interest, but nonetheless clearly expressed
that it intended to pursue new laws and regulations to address the
concerns raised during the hearings.'66

165. The Division of Public Health, Office of Health Facilities Licensing and
Certification was the state agency designated by HCFA to survey skilled nursing
facilities in order to ensure compliance with the federal conditions of
participation. See generally 42 C.F.R. § 483 (2001). One of the legislative
enactments that resulted from the Panel's work was the reconstitution of Health
Facilities into the newly-created Division of Long-term Care Resident Protection.
166. Another circumstance strengthened the Panel's resolve to legislate
reform. In the fall of 1997, Doctor Gregg C. Sylvester, then Director of the
Division of Public Health, in effect overruled a survey report issued by Health
Facilities. (At that time, Health Facilities was an agency of the Division of Public
Health.) The Director retracted over twenty-eight pages of survey violations
relating to the Harbor Healthcare and Rehabilitation Center in Sussex County,
Delaware. Senator Marshall, the Chairman of the Panel, was openly critical of the
Director's actions and noted that he was troubled by the perception that a state
agency charged with nursing home oversight had treated a facility as a customer.
In his view, the facility's residents are the state's customers.
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2. The Panel's recommendations
On February 9, 1998, the Panel issued its "Report to the People of the
State of Delaware. 1

67

In the report, the Panel developed findings and

recommendations for eight areas of policy review that it evaluated."6 The
following discussion represents a summary of the areas of policy review,
and the Panel's findings and recommendations.
a. Creationof the Division of Long-term Care
The Panel discovered that the state agencies, responsible for overseeing
Delaware's nursing homes, had failed to coordinate and communicate
effectively, thereby fragmenting nursing home regulation. 9 The Panel
noted that in some instances, the agencies work at cross-purposes. '
Therefore, the Panel recommended the creation of a Division of Longterm Care under the Delaware Department of Health and Social
Services. 7 All of the state agencies responsible for nursing home
regulation would be reclassified under the new division and would share a
common location. In addition, computer support would be integrated to
facilitate the creation of a centralized database for efficient coordination.
b. The Office of the Long-term Care Ombudsman
Throughout the public hearings, serious accusations of malfeasance
were directed at the Office of the Long-term Care Ombudsman
("Ombudsman's Office"), particularly with respect to its handling of
abuse and neglect complaints. Therefore, it was not surprising that the
Panel Report was critical of the Ombudsman's Office and recommended
its complete restructuring.'" Indeed, the Panel Report noted:
The Panel finds that the Office of Long-Term Care Ombudsman
and the Division of Aging have failed in their responsibilities to
make sure that the Office complies with its federal and state
statutory responsibilities. Despite the efforts of some dedicated
employees, the Office is, by its own admission, substantially out
of compliance with the federal Older Americans Act. The Panel

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Panel Report, supra note 155.
See id.
See id. at 6.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 7-9.
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finds that this lack
of compliance extends to the Office's state
173
mandates as well.
The Panel also condemned the Ombudsman's Office for lack of
administrative leadership and inadequate 74investigation and follow-up
concerning complaints of abuse and neglect.
The Panel recommended the reorganization of the Ombudsman's
Office beginning with the hiring of a state-wide manager, responsible for
"restoring order and structure to the Office and implementing systems
and reforms that will bring the Office back into compliance with state and
federal law. ' ' 7' The Panel also recommended the development of an
automated case management tracking system to assist the Ombudsman's
Office in documenting abuse and neglect allegations and providing
written responses to complainants. 76 In addition, the Panel suggested the
allocation of funds for seven new staff positions to handle the expanding
caseload of the Ombudsman's Office. 77
c. Appeals process and advisory boards
Based in significant part upon perceived defects in the process whereby
nursing homes may appeal deficiencies identified during facility surveys,
the Panel recommended that the state Department of Health and Social
Services develop a mechanism for handling appeals.' 78 The new "appeals
authority" would be empowered to hear issues raised by facility residents,
regulators, the Ombudsman's Office, and advocates for such persons.'79 In
effect, the Panel advocated for the creation of a specialized "court" to
hear disputes relating to long-term care.' 80 The Panel did not address
whether the decisions of the appeals authority would be binding on the
parties. 8'

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 8.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 9.
See id. at 10.
See id. at 9.
See id. at 9-10.
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d. Nursinghome employee trainingand development
As anticipated, the Panel recommended significant changes relating to
the training and staffing of CNAs.'" The Panel observed that the thencurrent requirement of seventy-five hours of training "is insufficient to
ensure that CNAs are adequately prepared for the responsibilities of the
job," and recommended an increase to a minimum standard of 120 hours,
to include additional training in nutrition.'83 Moreover, the Panel decried
"the shamefully-low wages that many nursing homes pay for CNAs," and
encouraged nursing homes to "accept their responsibility to pay CNAs a
living wage commensurate with their responsibilities.""
One of the Panel's more interesting suggestions pertained to CNA job
perception and satisfaction. The Panel recommended the establishment
of a 'career ladder' for CNAs, consisting of at least three levels: intern,
team member (greater length of employment would result in increased
pay), and team leader/preceptor (additional education would result in
increased pay). 5 In the Panel's view, creating a career ladder would
transform the CNA position into a true profession, rather than just a job
that is abandoned as soon as something better comes along.
e. Code of ethics andpublic disclosure
The Panel expressed concern that state employees charged with nursing
home oversight were not instructed adequately about conflict of interest
issues with regard to their oversight responsibilities. Thus, the Panel
recommended workshops for state employees to remind them of their
obligations under the state ethics guidelines.'" In addition, the Panel
called for the enactment of legislation that would require nursing homes
to disclose to residents and family members the facilities' relationships
with providers of nursing home services, such as pharmacies,
rehabilitation services providers and medical suppliers."
f

Role of the Office of the Attorney General

During the public hearing process, the Panel repeatedly expressed its

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

See id. at 11-12.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 11.
Seeid. at 12.
See id.
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opinion that nursing homes are getting away with widespread abuse
because the state enforcement agencies find abuse and neglect cases too
difficult to prosecute. These cases often are complicated by the fact that
the alleged victim is unable to participate in the state's case in a
meaningful way.
Thus, it came as no surprise that the Panel
recommended amending the physical abuse statutes under Delaware's
Health and Welfare Code to eliminate intentional conduct as the relevant
prosecutorial standard. 8 The Panel indicated that the statutes should be
amended to incorporate a knowing or reckless standard for prosecution."
The Panel also requested additional state funding to add two elder abuse
investigators, a prosecutor and a secretary, in the Medicaid Fraud Unit to
enable the Delaware Attorney General's Office to intervene in abuse and
neglect cases in a more timely manner."
Another significant Panel recommendation was a proposal to raise a
nursing home administrator's failure to report suspected abuse or other
violations from a misdemeanor offense to a felony.191 In addition, the
Panel advocated for legislation that would require mandatory criminal
background checks for any person offered employment by a nursing
home, as well as pre-employment drug screening."
g. Nursing home economic issues and interests
During the public hearing process, the Panel addressed the issue of
payment for nursing home services.
On the consumer side, witnesses
complained that many nursing homes limit the number of Medicaid-19
certified beds, which reduces placement options for many patients.
Consumers also complained about the nursing home practice of requiring
third-party payment guarantees.9 On the nursing home side, the industry
representatives expressed concern that new regulations would result in
increased costs, yet there was no provision for increasing Medicaid
reimbursement rates (which are substantially lower than facilities' private

188.
189.
190.

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 1131, 1136 (1995).
IOM REPORT, supra note 15, at 19, §§ 4.2 (b), 4.2 (a).
Panel Report, supra note 155, at 19.

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

See id. at 20.
See id.
See id. at 5.
See id. at 7.
See id.
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payment rates) to support the nursing homes' efforts to comply with the
regulations."

To address the concerns expressed by both groups, the Panel made
several recommendations. First, the Panel called for quarterly adjustment
of Medicaid reimbursement rates "to enable nursing homes to be fairly
remunerated for services provided to Medicaid patients."' 97 The Panel
also recommended the creation of a standard admission contract to be
used by all Delaware nursing homes, as well as a prohibition on the
practice of requiring third parties to personally guarantee payment of
nursing home bills." 8 Perhaps the most significant suggestion, from the
provider's point of view was the Panel's opinion that if a facility has any
Medicaid-certified beds, all the beds in that facility that are available to
the general nursing home population must be Medicaid-certified. 99
h. Quality of care

The Panel identified several problems with the quality of care provided
in many Delaware nursing homes. These problems included: inadequate
daily direct patient care; claims by certain nursing homes of possessing
specialized units for the care of dementia or stroke patients, even though
they are ill-equipped to handle such special-needs residents; the
perception of certain nursing homes that it is cheaper to be out of
compliance with federal and state regulations than to take corrective
measures; and finally, the lack of access to meaningful, easy-tounderstand information for consumers to make informed decisions."
Quality of care issues were of paramount importance to the Panel, and
it made seventeen separate recommendations for improving the quality of
care delivered by Delaware nursing homes."' Some of the more
significant recommendations of the Panel were:
(1) increase fines imposed on nursing homes that fail to comply
with nursing home regulations; 22
(2) create rules and regulations to govern the operation of

196.
197.
198.
199.

See id.
Id. at 21.
See id. at 22.
See id.

200.

Id. at 7.

201.

See id. at 25.

202.

Id. at 24.
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specialized
care units in nursing homes, such as Alzheimer's
23
units;
(3) require the Office of Health Facilities and Licensing and
Certification to schedule a meeting with residents and family
members upon the completion of a facility's survey process, i.e.,
after the facility has submitted its response
to the state survey
2
agency, to discuss the survey results; 1
(4) develop an annual consumer guide to Delaware nursing
home care, which should include information on survey
deficiencies and Ombudsman's
Office complaints for each
25
facility in the state; 1
(5) conduct a comprehensive review of existing nursing home
regulations to reduce redundancy and to clarify confusing
requirements so that nursing home administrators can have a
reasonable understanding of what is required under the
regulations;2" and
(6) increase staffing in the Office of Health Facilities and
Licensing and Certification to enable the agency to carry out
more surprise nursing home inspections.2°7
3. Legislative action

Several of the Panel's recommendations have been implemented
through legislation enacted by the Delaware General Assembly. 8
Serator Marshall has been the primary sponsor of most of this
legislation.Y Specifically, a new oversight division has been created to
monitor the long-term care industry in Delaware. 10 This new division,
designated as the Division of Long-term Care Resident Protection, is
responsible for licensure and certification surveys of long-term care
facilities.
It also oversees enforcement actions taken against
noncompliant facilities, and is designated by HCFA to perform federal

203.
204.
205.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 25.

206.

Id.

207.

Id. at 26.

208. See S. 302, 303, 304, 321, 322, 139th Gen. Assem. (Del. 1998); H.R. 559,
139th Gen. Assem. (Del. 1998).
209.
210.

See id.
See S. 302, 139th Gen. Assem. (Del. 1998).
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certification surveys. The new division is intended to coordinate longterm care oversight, and thereby avoid the lack of coordination that was
identified as a critical deficiency in the Panel Report.)
Another Panel recommendation that has been enacted is mandatory
criminal background checks and drug screening of applicants for
employment in nursing homes. 212 The law also applies to current nursing
home employees who are seeking a promotions. 3 Many facilities were
voluntarily performing pre-employment drug screening prior to the
passage of the drug screening requirement.24 However, the law sets forth
a list of5 illegal drugs that specifically must be included in the drug
screen.2
With regard to criminal background checks, the State Bureau of
Investigation conducts the state-funded checks. Fines will be imposed
upon employers who fail to conduct criminal background checks and
upon applicants who do not cooperate fully with the background check
process. 6 Certain criminal offenses, such as crimes against the elderly
and certain convictions for assault, automatically disqualify an applicant
from employment in a nursing home. For other offenses, it is left to the
discretion of the nursing home administration to determine whether the
individual is an appropriate candidate for employment.21
A number of other nursing home reform bills have been passed by the
Delaware General Assembly, including:
0

Senate Bill 304 (1391h

General Assembly) -

expanding the

Statement of Resident's Rights in the State of Delaware to: (1)
ensure that residents and their families are able to meaningfully
participate in treatment plans and decision-making, and (2) require
nursing homes to provide specific information about services
provided to residents and relationships with service providers. 9
211.
212.
Assem.
213.
214.
215.
216.
(1999).
217.
218.
219.

See id.
See S. 303, 139th Gen. Assem. (Del. 1998), amended by S. 13, 140th Gen.
(Del. 1999).
See S. 13 § 1142, 140th Gen. Assem. (Del. 1998).
See Wills v. Demopolis Nursing Home, Inc., 336 So.2d 1117 (Ala. 1976).
See S. 13 § 1142(c), 140th Gen. Assem. (Del. 1998).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1141(b), amended by S. 13, 140th Gen. Assem.
Id. § 1141(c).
Id.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit.

16, § 1121, amended by S. 304, 139th Gen. Assem.
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Senate Bill 322 ( 1 3 9 h General Assembly) - rewrote the state's

nursing home licensing statute for the first time since 1953, and
strengthened civil monetary penalty provisions.220
*

House Bill 558 (1391h General Assembly) - created a hearsay

exception to enable the prior statements of now-infirm nursing
home residents to be admitted in criminal abuse and neglect
prosecutions. '
T

Senate Bill 20 (140' General Assembly) - increased mandatory
training for CNA's from 75 hours of instruction to 150 hours,
divided evenly between classroom instruction and clinical work.
Created a voluntary career ladder to promote CNA retention and
professional development. 2
* Senate Bill 112 (1401h General Assembly) - lowered the standard
for prosecuting nursing home abuse and neglect cases from
"intentional" to "knowing or reckless." It also added the crime of
financial exploitation of the elderly or infirm to the state's criminal
code. 3
The nursing home industry in Delaware is bracing itself for additional
major reforms. Delaware nursing homes have a formidable opponent in
Senator Marshall, who has committed himself to "cleaning-up" what he
has characterized as a greedy and morally bankrupt industry.'" One
concrete indicator of the new aggressive approach to nursing home
oversight in Delaware is the dramatic increase in the number of arrests of
nursing home staff members on charges of resident abuse. For example,
during the period October 5-7, 1999, three CNAs from three different
nursing homes were arrested for allegedly assaulting residents.25 In each
*

(1998).
220. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 11, amended by S. 322, 139th Gen. Assem.
(1998).

221.
222.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3516 (1998).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 17, amended by S. 20, 139th Gen. Assem.

(1997).

223. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1131, amended by S. 112, 139th Gen. Assem.
(1997).
224. MEDICAL SOCIETY OF DELAWARE, LEGISLATIVE ALERTS AND UPDATES,
(last
available at http://www.capwiz.com/medsocdel/issues/alert/?alertid=432
visited Dec. 18, 2001).
225. Dennis Thompson, Jr., 3 Charged with Abusing Nursing Home Patients,
NEWS J. (Del.), Oct. 14, 1999, at B4.
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case, the alleged abuse occurred several months earlier, so the22 6close
proximity of arrests is suggestive of a deliberate enforcement effort.
In September 2000, a very significant bill introduced by Senator
Marshall was signed into law."' The law dramatically increases the
minimum staffing ratios required in Delaware nursing homes.228 The bill
ran into substantial opposition, primarily due to the projected financial
impact to the state-$10 to $11 million. 29 The bill also was flawed
because it ignored labor market realities. For example, in 2000, Delaware
had an unemployment rate of 3.2 percent, 30 and nursing homes already
were finding it difficult to meet staffing ratios.231 Despite these very
serious drawbacks, the bill was enacted, leaving nursing homes in the
unenviable position of needing to find more qualified caregivers at a time
when the entire health care industry is competing for a shrinking pool of
nurses and CNAs. The fact that the staffing bill was passed over such
vigorous opposition is a testimonial to the single-minded tenacity of the
reform movement in Delaware. It remains to be seen whether the
legislation ultimately will cause more problems than it remedies, as
nursing homes struggle with ever-increasing financial pressures and
staffing shortages.
E.

The Impact of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997

Prior to the passage of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA),22 the
nursing home industry enjoyed a period of unprecedented business
success and expansion. The expansion was fueled in part by a twenty-five
percent increase in spending on nursing facility care during the period
1992 to 1997.2" Spending attributable to Medicare more than tripled
226.
227.

See id.
S. 115,140th Gen. Assem. (Del. 1999).

228.

See id.
Local Legislative Update, DEL.

229.
HEALTH CARE FACILITIES ASS'N NEWSL.
(Del. Health Care Facilities Ass'n, Wilmington, Del.), June 1, 1999, at 2.

230.
231.

See source cited supra note 164.
See id.

232. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 11 Stat. 251 [hereinafter
BBA] (healthcare-related provisions codified as amended in scattered sections of

42 U.S.C.).
233.
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during this period, increasing from $2.8 billion in 1992 to $10.2 billion in
1997.'- The increase in Medicare spending coincided with diversification
among skilled nursing facilities to meet the needs of patients who were
coming into the facilities with increasingly serious and acute health
conditions.
One feature of the BBA was to cut $115 billion from entitlement
programs, particularly Medicaid and Medicare, to balance the budget.235
Of particular relevance to the nursing home industry, the BBA
established annual spending caps on therapies and moved skilled nursing
facilities from cost-based reimbursement to a prospective payment system
This payment system uses a fixed per diem rate for
(PPS).'
reimbursement, and all covered ancillary services, such as physical
therapy and speech therapy, are included in the rate.237 Formerly, the
ancillary services were billed separately by the ancillary service providers.
The long-term care industry initially welcomed PPS, but it soon became
apparent that the payment rate schedule and inflation adjuster set by
HCFA in May 1998 was too low.23 What has followed has been a
cataclysmic decline in the financial stability of the nursing home
industry." 9 Several of the largest nursing home companies-Vencor Inc.,
the nation's largest operator of long-term care facilities, Lenox
Healthcare Inc., Mariner Post Acute Network Inc., Integrated Health
Services Inc., and Sun Healthcare Group Inc.-as well as several regional
chains, were forced to file for bankruptcy protection.4 0 As noted by
available
at
1960-1999),
calendar
years
(selected
http://www.HCFA.gov/stats/nhe%2Doact/tables/Tables.pdf.
234. HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMIN., OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY, NATIONAL
HEALTH STATISTICS GROUP, U.S BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, TABLE 7, NURSING
EXPENDITURE

HOME CARE EXPENDITURES AGGREGATE AND PER CAPITA AMOUNTS AND
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION, BY SOURCE OF FUNDS (selected calendar years 1960-

1999), available at http://www.HCFA.gov/stats/nhe%2Doact/Tables/Tables.pdf.

235.
236.

See BBA, supra note 232.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395yy(e)(2)(B) (Supp. 1999).

See id.
Nursing Home Warns Funding Shortfall Could Compromise Care,
24, 2000), at
(Jan.
NEWS
FOR
PROFESSIONALS
REUTERS
MED.
http://www.reutershealth.com/frame2/ arch.html; see Integrated Health Services
Seeks Protection, Joins List of Nursing Chains in Chapter 11, 24 DAILY REP. FOR
EXEC., Feb. 4, 2000, at A4.
239. See Integrated Health Services, supra note 238, at A4.
240. See id.
237.
238.
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Integrated Health Services' CEO, "The dramatic impact of the
implementation of the 1997 Balanced Budget Act on our revenues and
cash flow seriously [impaired] the company's ability to service our current
capital structure." 21 Unquestionably, federal spending cuts caused severe
damage to the stability of the industry.
The rapid decline of the nursing home industry's financial health
prompted Congress to take steps to ease the crisis, such as temporarily
increasing funding to the nursing home industry and other healthcare
providers.2 However, one must question whether such action will
merely act as a temporary repair, as money cannot fix all that ails the
industry. At the same time that the industry was affected by a dramatic
federal spending cut, it also has been targeted by increased regulatory and
enforcement initiatives on both the federal and state levels. This
necessarily entails an increase in compliance costs. Perhaps even more
troubling, however, is the alarming rise in tort litigation that could
potentially bankrupt the entire nursing home industry.2'"
F.

Nursing Home Litigation

Tort lawsuits against nursing homes, as well as the size of verdicts in
such cases, are increasing at an alarming pace. 2" One need only drive on a
major highway today and view the countless roadside advertisements to
confirm that nursing homes have become a popular target for plaintiffs'
lawyers.25 Prominent billboards encourage individuals who suspect that
loved ones have been abused or neglected in nursing homes to consult
with an attorney about filing a lawsuit.2" Recent television, radio, and
print advertisements have also sought potential plaintiffs to pursue
241. Integrated Health Services, supra note 171b, at A4-5; see Vencor Files for
Bankruptcy, Employees will be Paid, PROVIDER, Nov. 1999, at 17 (statement of
Edward Kuntz, Vencor's CEO and President "[tihe reorganization also was
necessary because of the dramatic changes impacting the long term care industry,
most notably decreased Medicare reimbursement.").
242. Medicare, Medicaid, and State Children's Health Insurance Program
(SCHIP) Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113 App. F,
113 Stat. 1501A-321 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1305).
243.

Nursing Home Warns, supra note 238.

244.

See Hawryluk, supra note 12, at 29.

245.

See id.

246. Such billboards have been observed along Interstate 95 between
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and Wilmington, Delaware.
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litigation against nursing homes."7 In one instance, some 3,500 letters
were sent to certified nursing assistants exhorting them to call an abuse
hotline.2' The number actually belonged to a law firm that specializes in
suits against nursing homes.

9

Moreover, plaintiffs' attorneys and resident advocates alike are
lobbying for a federal law that guarantees the right to use surveillance
Advocates argue that installing
cameras in nursing facilities."0
surveillance cameras, popularly referred to as "granny cams," may
prevent abuse and neglect of nursing home residents, under the theory
that staff members would realize their encounters with residents are being
recorded, and control their conduct accordingly." The proposed law
would allow video cameras to be installed with the permission of the
nursing home resident or his or her legal representative, z2 and nursing
home staff would be informed that their interactions with the resident
were being recorded." 3 The resident or his or her representative would
bear the cost of the camera and installation! 4
It should not come as a surprise that among the most vocal advocates
for "granny cams" are plaintiffs' lawyers, including Jim Wilkes, a highprofile Florida lawyer who specializes in nursing home cases.2 ' Although
Mr. Wilkes resents the suggestion that the main benefit of cameras in
nursing homes would be to provide evidence in court, it is beyond
question that surveillance cameras could yield critical information in
nursing home abuse and neglect cases, especially because the alleged
victim is often unable to meaningfully participate in the proceedings due
to cognitive limitations. "
Nursing home abuse and neglect cases typically have not been
attractive to the plaintiffs' bar, due in large part to the assumption that the
247.
248.

Hawryluk, supra note 12, at 29.
See id.

249.

See id.

250. See Deborah Sharp, Coalition Backs "Granny Cams," USA TODAY,
Sept. 14, 1999, at Al.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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See id.
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characteristics of the average nursing home resident do not lend
themselves to large damage awards. 8
Usual components of
compensatory damages, such as lost wages and out-of-pocket medical
expenses, are inapplicable to most nursing home residents, who are long
past their working years and whose medical expenses are likely covered
by Medicare or Medicaid." 9 Causation is also often difficult to establish in
nursing home tort cases. In addition to cognitive impairments, nursing
home residents are prone to certain conditions, such as bruising and skin
tears, which may appear to be the result of abuse or neglect to the
untrained eye, when in fact, they are the unfortunate and unavoidable
consequences of compromised and deteriorating health status.
Nonetheless, three key factors are leading plaintiffs' lawyers to reconsider
their reluctance to file tort suits against nursing homes: (1) the enactment
of elder abuse laws that permit successful plaintiffs to recover attorneys'
fees;2' 6 (2) the lure of huge punitive damage awards;261 and (3) a more
knowledgeable and resourceful consumer population.262
Plaintiffs' attorneys, such as Jim Wilkes, argue that the civil justice
system is far more effective as a quality improvement mechanism than the
regulatory system that oversees nursing homes.263 According to Mr.
Wilkes, the regulatory system is "a joke," and it "needs to be revamped
from the bottom to top-for everybody's benefit."'26 Mr. Wilkes credits

258. See id.
259. See id.
260. California, for example, permits a plaintiff to recover attorneys' fees when
it is proven that the defendant intentionally or recklessly abused an elderly or
infirm adult. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15657 (West 2001). Likewise, Florida's
nursing home residents' rights law allows for private enforcement through lawsuits
and recovery of attorneys' fees by successful plaintiffs. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 400.023
(West 1998 & Supp. 2001).
261. See Hawryluk, supra note 12, at 29. Courts in California, Florida and
Texas have seen significant increases in nursing home litigation, which is not
surprising, given that huge punitive damage awards available in each of these
states. Id.
262. For example, federal survey data for every Medicare and Medicaidcertified facility in the country is available online at HCFA's website. Moreover,
HCFA publishes a nursing home consumer information guide called "Guide to
Choosing a Nursing Home," which provides nursing home patients and their
families with information about nursing homes, including residents' rights.
263. See Hawryluk, supra note 12, at 34.
264. Id.
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tort litigation with bringing about major improvements in the way nursing
homes do business, stating, "I have been told that [as a result of lawsuits]
record keeping policies have changed, staffing policies have changed,
training has changed, that there's been a new focus among certain
corporations on quality-of-life issues rather than simply quality of care."2"
The value of tort litigation as a means of resolving nursing home
quality of care and quality of life issues is dubious at best. While the
specter of a huge damage awards undoubtedly encourages nursing
facilities to provide the best possible care, the recent spate of litigation is
draining already scarce resources dedicated to patient care and quality of
life issues, as nursing homes scurry to fund litigation war chests. While
meritorious claims exist, many others are without foundation. Still, given
the stakes involved, all claims must be vigorously defended.
Litigation expenses are only part of the problem. The increase in tort
litigation has also adversely impacted other nursing home costs. For
example, the average annual cost for nursing home malpractice insurance
nationwide rose from $150 per bed in 1992 to $700 per bed in 1998.266 In
Florida, which has 10 percent of the nation's nursing home residents but
accounts for 40 percent of nursing home lawsuits, the average cost of
insuring a nursing home bed has skyrocketed to more than $6,200 per
year.' 6' Further complicating the situation is the fact that many insurance
carriers are dropping their nursing home lines altogether, leaving just a
few providers in the market.269 Because nursing homes must carry
insurance to operate, insurance companies that continue to underwrite
policies for nursing homes can command virtually any premium they
wish. 70
Other costs associated with the litigious environment in which nursing
homes operate today are more difficult to quantify, but are undoubtedly
significant. The prevalence of litigation may discourage much-needed
caregivers from seeking employment in the nursing home industry. In
265.
266.
267.

Id.
Id. at 43.
Vickie Chachere, Florida Nursing Homes Struggle With Lawsuits,
SUNDAY STAR-LEDGER (N.J.), Apr. 23, 2000, Sec. 1 at 25.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. See Hawryluk, supra note 12, at 43 (suggesting that insurance companies
will raise costs of the insurance even if it is priced out of the reach of many nursing
homes).
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addition, existing caregivers and administrators already are feeling the
pressure of funding cuts and increased regulatory enforcement, including
calls for criminal prosecutions of staff members who are connected to
allegations of neglect and abuse. The threat of becoming embroiled in
costly civil litigation may be the final straw that drives experienced
nursing home personnel out of the industry at a time when the industry
can least afford a "brain drain."
Furthermore, liability in nursing home neglect and abuse lawsuits
rarely is open and shut. As noted above, certain conditions that are
simply an unfortunate by-product of declining health can be cast as abuse
and neglect in the hands of a skillful plaintiff's attorney. Decubitus ulcers
or pressure sores, which are frequent subjects of litigation, fall into this
category. While in some cases pressure sores may be indicative of
inadequate or incompetent care, they frequently are caused by a complex
interplay of many different factors; namely, underlying health conditions,
nutritional problems and mobility limitations. The common assumption is
that pressure sores result from remaining in one position for too long,
which leads to the conclusion that the nursing home's staff must be at
fault. Such preconceived notions, however, may be impossible to
overcome, and the consequences can be devastating. For example, a
Texas jury recently found that a nursing home resident developed serious
pressure sores due to the facility's negligent treatment. 7
The jury
assessed a staggering $90 million in punitive damages against the nursing
home.' 2 The court remitted the punitive damage award, but even the
73
reduced sum of almost $10 million was overwhelming.
In another case, a California jury found a nursing home liable for
neglect in connection with a resident who, at the time of her death, had
several advanced-stage pressure sores. 74
The jury awarded the
representative of the deceased resident $165,000 in compensatory
damages, and the court determined that the representative was entitled to
recover an additional $185,000 in attorneys' fees based on the jury's
finding that the nursing home was reckless in its treatment of the
resident.275
271. See Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 985 S.W.2d 216, 221 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1999); see also discussion suprapp. 4-5.
272. Id. at 221.
273. Id.
274. See Delaney v. Baker, 971 P.2d 986 (Cal. 1999).
275. Id. at 989.
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Injuries from falls are another fertile source of lawsuits against nursing
homes that have resulted in staggering damage awards. In 1998, an Ohio
jury awarded the spouse of a nursing home resident, who died as a result
of brain injuries caused by two separate falls, $168,000 in compensatory
damages and punitive damages of $850,000.276 Falls present a particularly
difficult situation for nursing homes. Federal standards direct facilities to
minimize the use of restraints and to maximize the physical well-being of
residents. The benefits of maintaining and maximizing mobility of
nursing home patients are well-documented.277 However, maintaining
mobility necessarily entails a heightened risk of falls.
Facilities already must strike a delicate balance between three
competing goals: maximizing residents' mobility, avoiding the use of
restraints, and protecting residents from fall-related injuries. Adding the
threat of fall-related tort lawsuits to the equation may tip the balance in
favor of excessive caution, to the disadvantage of nursing home residents,
as some facilities may make a conscious decision to err on the side of
discouraging and restricting mobility to decrease litigation risk. Although
cost-benefit analysis may seem offensive where human beings are
involved, the reality is that in the current regulatory environment, it may
be cheaper for a nursing home to be cited for failing to maximize
residents' well-being than to expose the facility to the risk of a costly and
protracted lawsuit. Such a strategy likely would backfire, however, as
plaintiff's lawyers would just substitute a violation of resident's rights
lawsuit for the fall injury case. It is a no-win situation for nursing homes.
Another troubling aspect of the increase in tort litigation against
nursing homes is the fact that each year many claims of abuse and neglect
are proven to be completely false. For example, in April 2000, a seventy
eight year old female resident of the Neshaminy Manor Nursing Home in
Norristown, Pennsylvania told her family that she had been sexually

276. See Blancett v. Nationwide Care, Inc., No. 98-CA-4, 1998 Ohio App.
LEXIS 6504, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 16, 1998); see also discussion supra pp. 4-5.
277. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 483.25(a)(1)(ii)(1999), which provides:

(a) Activities of daily living. Based on the comprehensive assessment of
a resident, the facility must ensure that -

(1) A resident's abilities in activities of daily living do not diminish
unless circumstances of the individual's clinical condition
demonstrate that diminution was unavoidable. This includes the
resident's ability to ....
(ii) Transfer and ambulate ....
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assaulted by a male staff member.278 The family immediately reported the
assault to the facility's administrator, who, in turn, contacted law
enforcement.279 While the investigation was pending, four male staff
members were placed on indefinite administrative leave."8 Subsequently,
the resident revealed to investigators that she had been feeling lonely and
ignored, so she made up the story "to get attention from her family."'"
Unfortunately, false claims are not uncommon in the nursing home
industry m Many nursing home residents who suffer from cognitive
problems, depression, hostility and/or feelings of loneliness and isolation,
complain of being mistreated and abused. Others report having their
personal possessions damaged or stolen, when in fact, nothing untoward
has occurred.
While all complaints must be taken seriously and
investigated promptly, the circumstances of the nursing home population
must be considered by those who contend that resorting to the tort system
is an appropriate means of regulating the nursing home industry.
From all indications, tort litigation against nursing homes will continue
to increase at a rapid pace despite numerous negative effects on the
industry and residents. Moreover, with the current get-tough attitude of
regulators and legislators, it is highly unlikely that there will be much
legislative support for statutory limits on damages assessed against
nursing homes. Legislators will not act until more nursing home chains
file for bankruptcy protection or are forced to close nursing facilities in
the legislators' districts. In the meantime, nursing homes must focus their
energies on delivering the best possible care. This is the only way that
facilities can minimize the likelihood of becoming entangled in potentially
devastating tort litigation.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Nursing homes devote significant resources to regulatory compliance
278. Local Evening News (Philadelphia, PA) (NBC television broadcast, Apr.
21, 2000).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Even reformers have recognized the problem of false reporting of nursing
home complaints. For example, the Delaware nursing home reform included a
recommendation "that legislation be enacted which would make intentional false
reporting of activity by a nursing home employee a sanctionable offense." Panel
Report, supra note 155, at 9.
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efforts. They do so for two primary reasons: (1) they want to deliver the
highest quality care to their residents, and (2) penalties for
noncompliance can be significant. Nevertheless, it appears that every day
there are reports of egregious abuse and neglect of nursing home
residents, which foster calls for regulators to crackdown on the entire
nursing home industry. Legislators and regulators are responding to the
complaints by pursuing new laws and regulations, instead of focusing on
the poor performing facilities. Not only does this approach fail to fix the
immediate problems, but it also has shifted the entire emphasis of nursing
home regulation to detection and punishment, rather than prevention.
During the past fifteen years, the nursing home industry in this country
has been extensively researched and scrutinized. The result has been the
creation of a complex system of federal and state laws and regulations
that has as its core purpose the protection of nursing home residents. 3 At
minimum, every nursing facility in the United States must satisfy state
licensure and certification requirements." The eighty-six percent of the
nation's nursing homes that participate in either Medicare or Medicaid
also must satisfy the federal conditions of participation.28 If nursing
homes do not meet the applicable regulatory standards, both the federal
and state regulatory frameworks include a variety of penalties that may be
imposed on the noncompliant facilities.m
Throughout the recent debates regarding nursing home reform, no one
has argued that quality of care problems in nursing homes are attributable
to a lack of regulation. Rather, on the rare occasions when the focus
shifts to problem-solving instead of punishment, the same causes are
highlighted: under-funding, staffing shortages, and inept enforcement by
regulators charged with the responsibility of overseeing the nursing home
industry. These issues are not new. To the contrary, the same problems
were identified by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) during its
comprehensive study of the nursing home industry in 1986." This leads
to the inescapable conclusion that the complex regulatory framework
created under OBRA 87 and related state laws has not remedied the root
causes of deficient practices in nursing homes. Thus, the idea that
283. See QUALITY
284.
285.
286.
(1994).
287.

STANDARDS REPORT, supra note 1.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(1)(A) (1994).
See QUALITY STANDARD REPORTS, supra note 1.
See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-1396r

See IOM REPORT, supra note 21, at 21.
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creating additional layers of regulation will lead to improved quality of
care is ill-conceived and naive.
If legislators and regulators truly want to foster top quality care in the
nation's seventeen thousand nursing homes,m they must address the
systemic problems that plague the nursing home industry. First and
foremost, increasing the funding of nursing homes must be made a
national priority. All the regulatory mandates in the world will not help
nursing home residents in the absence of funding that allows nursing
homes to comply with those mandates.
The financial troubles of the nursing home industry are welldocumented, as numerous providers have sought protection under the
federal bankruptcy laws since 1999, and many others are poised to follow
in their footsteps. Critics of the nursing home industry argue that the
industry is hiding behind the claim of financial crisis to avoid taking
responsibility for deficient practices, and that in fact, money is being
funneled
to the pockets of facility owners, at the expense of resident
9
care. 2

Indeed, the Special Committee on Aging has made it clear that it
questions the validity of the contention that the financial problems being
experienced by many nursing homes are a function of underfunding.290 In
that regard, the Special Committee has commissioned a study of nursing
home financing to look at the capital structure of nursing homes, as well
as their spending patterns.9 It is interesting that the Special Committee's
skepticism is flatly contradicted by federal and state regulators, who are
unlikely allies of the nursing home industry when it comes to the funding
issue.292 HCFA has made a plea for increased funding, stating that it is
"making solid progress" in improving nursing home quality, but the lack
of funding to implement many of the GAO's recommendations and other
improvements limits HCFA's successes. 3
In addition, Delaware's oversight agencies have advocated for funding
increases, claiming that the lack of adequate funding inhibits their ability

288.
289.
290.

See CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 1.
See Thompson, supra note 9.
See Nursing Home Understaffing,supra note 162, at A32.

291.

See id. at A33.

292.
293.

See id.
See Oversight of Nursing Home Inspections Faulty, Uneven, GAO Tells

Senate Panel, DAILY REP. FOR EXEC., Nov. 4, 1999 at A13.
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to effectively enforce nursing home regulations.294 Consequently, funding
shortfalls are impacting regulators and providers alike. With respect to
providers, until there is a commitment on the part of federal and state
governments to fund nursing home care at rates commensurate with the
true costs of doing business, it is unrealistic to assume that quality
problems will be corrected in an effective and lasting manner.
The lack of adequate nursing home funding is closely associated with
another systemic problem in the nursing home industry: the difficulty of
attracting and retaining competent, compassionate caregivers.2 5 As noted
above, CNAs provide up to eighty percent of direct patient care in
nursing homes, yet they are paid similarly to fast-food employees.2
Additional funding is necessary to enable nursing homes to pay CNAs a
meaningful wage that recognizes the difficult nature of the work that they
perform everyday. Moreover, directing funding increases towards
caregivers, rather than enforcement initiatives, would prove to be far
more practical.
Staffing issues cannot be solved by money alone. In addition to low
pay, several factors contribute to the dearth of CNAs/caregivers in the
nursing home industry, including: burn-out, lack of professional
development, inadequate training, and high stress caused by enforcement
approaches make caregivers feel embattled and unappreciated.2 97 The
nursing home industry must regard CNAs as professional caregivers.
Offering career paths, promotional opportunities, continuous training,
and meaningful participation on caregiving teams may go a long way
toward changing the common perception that a CNA position is a deadend job. Obviously, the goal of retaining quality caregivers also would be
advanced by the adoption of a new attitude among regulators-one that
does not reflect a belief that most CNAs are abusive criminals who could
not get jobs in any other line of work.'29

294.
295.

See Panel Report, supra note 155, at 19.
See Nursing Home Understaffing, supra note 162, at A33-34.

296.

Id.

297.
298.

Id.
During an April 19, 2000 meeting of the Health Law Section of the

Delaware State Bar Association, Senator Marshall extolled the virtues of the new
criminal background check law, noting that the nursing home industry has long

been a haven for criminals. Senator Marshall, Remarks at the Meeting of the
Delaware State Bar Association Health Law Section (Apr. 19, 2000) (on file with
author).
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Funding and staffing shortages are relatively easy problems to address
in comparison to the issue of inept regulatory oversight. It is submitted
that regulators already have adequate regulations and enforcement tools
available to them-perhaps even too many. The problem lies in how
regulators interpret and apply those regulations and enforcement tools.
Rather than focusing on the development of new laws and regulations, the
nursing home oversight agencies should devote their resources to: (1)
critical self-examination to identify deficiencies in the manner in which
their oversight responsibilities are carried out; (2) formulating and
implementing action plans to address any identified deficiencies; (3)
training survey and enforcement personnel; and (4) sharing their
knowledge and expertise with the nursing home industry.29 Training is a
particularly important piece of the puzzle, because oversight agencies
must understand the regulations in order to effectively enforce them.
Here again, money sought for pure enforcement activities would be better
directed to training the regulators, who, in turn, could share their
knowledge and expertise with the nursing home industry. Regrettably,
oversight agencies believe that nursing homes should resolve compliance
issues on their own, informing them if they reached the correct
conclusions during their surveys. 3 0
This indirect approach is
tremendously inefficient, unduly punitive, and most importantly, does not
promote the goal of high quality resident care.
Finally, although not yet a systemic problem, it is beyond question that
the current increase in tort litigation against nursing homes has the
potential to devastate the entire industry. If permitted to continue
unchecked, these lawsuits will only further exacerbate the current
financial crisis facing the nursing home industry, with an attendant decline
in resident services. Decisive steps must be taken promptly to limit the
exposure of nursing homes to huge damage awards, which, in many cases,
are grossly disproportionate to the nature of the injuries alleged in the
suits.
CONCLUSION
Nursing homes in the United States are facing a broad array of
challenges that threaten their very existence. For example, federal and
state governments are pursuing a variety of legislative and regulatory
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See Oversight of Nursing Home, supra note 293, at A13.
See id.
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initiatives that are designed to ferret out and punish nursing homes that
fail to meet the standards of participation in federal funding programs, as
well as state licensing standards. While no one can argue that providers of
substandard care should not be held accountable, the "zero tolerance"
approach advocated by many regulators ignores the realities of the
nursing home population and essentially treats nursing homes as
guarantors of the continued well-being of residents. This is a patently
unreasonable position in view of the health status of the typical nursing
home resident.
Moreover, the new zero tolerance approach to nursing home
enforcement is coming at a time when nursing home funding is being
slashed, and eager plaintiffs' lawyers are targeting the nursing home
industry for the next wave of mass tort litigation. These pressures, if left
unchecked, may force many nursing homes out of business at a time when
the demand for nursing home care is increasing at a dramatic rate. In the
absence of a rational approach to nursing home regulation and
enforcement, and at least some degree of protection from the potentially
devastating consequences of tort litigation, the nursing home industry in
this country may be poised to go the way of the dinosaur.

